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Habeas as Forum Allocation:
A New Synthesis
CARLOS M. VÁZQUEZ*
The scope of habeas relief for state prisoners, especially
during the decades before the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen, is a famously disputed question—one
of recognized significance for contemporary debates about
the proper scope of habeas review. This Article provides a
new answer. It argues that, until the enactment of Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
it was broadly accepted that state prisoners were entitled to
plenary federal review of the legal and mixed law/fact questions decided against them by state courts. Until 1916, such
review was provided by the Supreme Court; after 1953, such
review was provided by the lower federal courts via habeas.
The situation between 1916 and 1953 was murkier. This Article shows that this was a transitional period marked by disagreement among the Justices as to the appropriate federal
forum to review state court decisions resulting in custody. At
the beginning of this period, a majority of Justices continued
to insist that the responsibility rested with Supreme Court.
Towards the end of this period, the Court shifted this responsibility to the habeas courts as a majority of Justices came
to recognize that the Court could no longer hope to monitor
state court criminal convictions. The Justices during this period agreed that federal review of state court convictions
*

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful for
helpful comments from Ruthanne Deutsch, Stephen Goldblatt, Tara Leigh Grove,
Vicki Jackson, Victoria Nourse, Michael Seidman, Brad Snyder, and Mark
Tushnet. I am also grateful for research assistance from Daniel Emam and Dani
Zylberberg, and from Thanh Nguyen and his colleagues at Georgetown’s Edward
Bennett Williams Law Library.
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was necessary, but disagreed about which federal court
should provide such review. The scope of habeas jurisdiction
during this period, as before and after, reflected the Justices’
views about the proper allocation of jurisdiction among federal courts to review the state courts’ decisions on constitutional questions arising in criminal cases resulting in custody.
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INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Allen, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court held that
federal courts adjudicating the habeas petitions of persons convicted
of crimes in state court should apply a de novo standard of review
with respect to issues of law and of application of law to fact.1 This
1

See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953) (“Where the ascertainment
of the historical facts does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of
the legal significance of such facts, the District Judge must exercise his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values.”); Justice Frankfurter’s analysis
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standard of review prevailed until the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Taylor interpreted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) as establishing a standard of review more
deferential to state courts.2 Whether Brown’s de novo standard was
a departure from the standard the courts had previously applied in
habeas cases is a famously disputed question. In an influential article, Professor Paul M. Bator argued that the Court in Brown broadly
expanded the availability of habeas relief to state prisoners, an expansion that he criticized as undesirable as well as unprecedented.3
Before Brown, he argued, the federal courts properly declined to
grant habeas relief to state prisoners unless the state court had failed
to provide a full and fair hearing of the petitioner’s constitutional
claims.4 In Professor Bator’s view, the limited scope of federal habeas review meant that the state courts often had the final word regarding the federal constitutional rights implicated in state criminal
proceedings.5 This view was disputed by Justice Brennan, who, in
Fay v. Noia, maintained that habeas courts had always provided plenary review of state prisoners’ fundamental rights.6 Justice Brennan’s version of the history was defended at some length by Professor Gary Peller.7
More recently, Professor James Liebman has offered a third version of the pre-Brown history, arguing that both Professor Bator, on
the one hand, and Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, on the other

on this point was expressly endorsed by Justices Burton and Clark, see id. at 488,
and Justices Black and Douglas, see id. at 513. See also Wright v. West, 505 U.S.
277, 287–88 n.4 (1992).
2
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000). See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996).
3
See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 499–501 (1963).
4
Id. at 463–64, 465 (“The understanding seemed to be much nearer to the
guideposts set out above: a prisoner is not held in ‘violation’ of federal law if a
state court of competent jurisdiction has through fair process—though perhaps
erroneously—decided that question on the merits.”).
5
See id. at 448–49.
6
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–27 (1963).
7
See generally Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 581–82 (1982).
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hand, had gotten parts of the history wrong.8 According to Professor
Liebman, the habeas statutes always authorized de novo review of
constitutional issues decided by the state courts, but only “where the
writ is the only effective means of preserving [the petitioner’s]
rights.”9 During the Nineteenth Century, habeas was almost never
necessary for this purpose, as any person convicted in the state
courts had a right to Supreme Court review of any federal questions
decided against her by the state courts.10 When the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction became discretionary, however, the lower federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap.11 The writ
then became the only effective means of preserving the constitutional rights of state prisoners.12 In Professor Liebman’s telling, federal review of state court criminal convictions was always available,
but the forum responsible for providing such review shifted in the
early part of the Twentieth Century.13
Although Professor Liebman did not use the term, he argued essentially that the Supreme Court’s rules addressing the scope of habeas review served a forum-allocation function: these rules allocated
among federal courts the responsibility for monitoring the state
courts’ protection of the constitutional rights of state criminal defendants.14 Before the shift, the Supreme Court was responsible for

8

See generally James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997,
2055–94 (1992).
9
Id. at 2055 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1943)).
10
See id. at 2068–75.
11
See id. at 2075–80.
12
See id.
13
See id. at 2073–75.
14
All rules of federal jurisdiction are “forum allocating” in the sense that they
distribute judicial power between federal and state courts. I use the term to describe the distribution of judicial power among federal courts. This sense of the
term can be traced to Vicki C. Jackson’s thesis that the Eleventh Amendment
serves a forum-allocation function by allocating the power to enforce the federal
obligations of the states between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 14–15, 74 (1988). The Supreme Court rejected the forum allocation understanding of the Eleventh Amendment in Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity,
Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1927–30 (2000). See
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providing such review; afterwards, the lower federal courts were responsible for doing so.15 At no point were state prisoners’ constitutional rights relegated to the state courts without de novo federal review, as Professor Bator had argued.16
This Article offers a fourth version of the pre-Brown history,
bridging in some respects the other contending versions. The preBrown cases show that Professor Liebman is right about the reason
for the Twentieth Century expansion of the availability of habeas
review for state prisoners.17 As discussed in Part I of this Article, de
novo federal court review of state criminal convictions was available throughout the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries.18 Until 1916, state prisoners (like all state court litigants) had a right to
review in the Supreme Court of any federal issue decided against
them. Before 1867, the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction generally
did not even extend to state prisoners. After that date, the Court articulated and enforced a rule under which the habeas courts were
generally to deny relief to state prisoners convicted of crimes in state
courts, the rationale being that direct review in the Supreme Court
was available as of right and should ordinarily be pursued. Professor
Liebman is correct to note that the rule requiring federal habeas
courts to stay their hands fell away in direct response to the Supreme
Court’s renunciation of the error-correction role it had previously
fulfilled.19
But Professor Bator is closer to being right regarding the timing
of the expansion of habeas jurisdiction. Professor Liebman dates the
shift from direct review in the Supreme Court to de novo review in

also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1700–08 (1997).
15
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2072–78.
16
See id. at 2080 (“[F]ollowing the certiorarification of the Court’s direct
appellate docket, the Court’s inability to satisfy by itself the federal courts’ statutory obligation to conduct review as of right, according to those principles, of the
constitutionality of state detention thrust the obligation on the lower federal courts
on habeas corpus.” (emphasis in original)).
17
See infra Part II.
18
See Jordan M. Steiker, Habeas Corpus, ENCYC. OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
(2002), http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/law/law/habeascorpus.
19
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2073–77
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the habeas courts to the Court’s 1915 decision in Frank v. Magnum.20 Although the first statute replacing (some of) the Court’s
mandatory writ of error review with discretionary writ of certiorari
review was enacted in 1916, Professor Liebman argues that Frank
responded to an unofficial “certiorarification” of direct review that
preceded the formal certiorarification beginning in 1916.21
But, as discussed in Part II of this Article, the pre-Brown cases
tell a somewhat different story. Well after the 1916 amendments to
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court continued to
recite and apply the restrictive standards it had applied before the
amendments.22 As this Article shows, the cases demonstrate that,
long after the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over state court judgments became formally discretionary, the Court continued to regard
itself as the appropriate forum for review of state criminal convictions. The Court realized only gradually that it could not hope to
perform an error-correction function, and only then did it finally
abandon the pre-1916 limits on habeas review of state criminal convictions.23
In particular, this Article shows that the years between 1916 and
1953 were a transitional period characterized by disagreement
among the Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas review.
The Justices agreed that meaningful federal review of state criminal
convictions was necessary, but they disagreed about whether such
review should take place in the Supreme Court on direct review or
in the lower federal courts via habeas corpus.24 Some Justices believed strongly that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances,
only the Supreme Court should undertake the sensitive task of reviewing state court convictions and potentially setting free a person
whose conviction had been upheld by the highest state court. In the
view of these Justices, the Court should continue to perform an error-correction function in exercising its discretionary certiorari jurisdiction over state criminal convictions. Other Justices believed
that the lower federal courts were better situated to perform such
20
21
22
23
24

See id. See generally Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2075–77
See infra text accompanying notes 136–160.
See infra Part II.
See id.
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review via habeas corpus.25 The latter view gradually came to prevail as the Justices came to realize that they could no longer feasibly
fulfill an error-correction function. Brown v. Allen confirmed this
shift in 1953 by holding both that the habeas courts should no longer
regard a denial of certiorari as reflecting the Court’s views on the
merits of a state criminal defendant’s legal claims and that the habeas courts should review questions of law and mixed questions of
law and fact de novo.26
Although the cases tend to support Professor Bator’s story insofar as the timing of the expansion of habeas review is concerned,
they also show that he was wrong about the reason for the restricted
availability of habeas relief in the decades before the Brown decision. At no point did the Court relegate state prisoners to the state
courts for the protection of their constitutional rights. The need for
broad federal review of state criminal convictions was recognized
throughout. The narrow scope of review in the decades after 1916
was based on the Court’s continuing conviction that, despite the
newly discretionary nature of its appellate jurisdiction, it alone
should be the federal forum reviewing and possibly reversing state
criminal convictions.27 The loosening of the restrictions on the lower
courts’ exercise of their habeas jurisdiction was based on the Court’s
gradual realization that it could no longer hope to monitor state court
decisions resulting in custody.28 This realization led the Court to
conclude that the writ of habeas corpus was the only effective means
of preserving the constitutional rights of state prisoners.29 Although
some pre-Brown cases included language or reasoning foreshadowing the shift, the first clear articulation of the de novo standard came
in Brown v. Allen.30
The pre-Brown history of habeas corpus has potentially important implications for current debates about the scope of habeas
relief for state prisoners. In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas relied
on Professor Bator’s claim that Brown’s standard was aberrational
25

See infra Part II and text accompanying notes 221–44.
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
27
See infra text accompanying notes 148–58, 192–214.
28
See infra text accompanying notes 221–44.
29
See id.
30
See Brown, 344 U.S. at 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
26
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in urging a return to a more deferential standard.31 Justice O’Connor,
for her part, relied on Justice Brennan’s history in arguing that any
change in the standard should come from Congress.32 The new understanding of the pre-Brown standard defended here exposes as unprecedented Justice Thomas’ proposal to narrow the scope of habeas
review without correspondingly broadening the availability of direct
review in the Supreme Court.
In enacting AEDPA in 1996, Congress amended the statute governing habeas relief for state prisoners, and a slim majority of the
Court in Williams v. Taylor held that Congress had adopted Justice
Thomas’ deferential habeas standard.33 Specifically, the Court held
that, if the prisoner’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, the habeas court may not grant relief merely
because the state court’s decision was erroneous; it may grant relief
only if the state court’s error was unreasonable.34 In other words,
AEDPA (as interpreted in Williams35) replaces the de novo standard
of review with a standard requiring the habeas courts to deny relief
to state prisoners in custody pursuant to wrong but reasonable state
court decisions.36 If so, then AEDPA consigns erroneously convicted state prisoners to continued imprisonment (or even execution).
The long history of treating habeas as a forum-allocation device—as detailed in this Article—suggests an alternative understanding of AEDPA. AEDPA does not limit the Supreme Court’s
power to review and reverse wrong but reasonable state court decisions resulting in custody. Indeed, the statute’s sponsors believed
that Congress lacked the constitutional power to limit the Supreme

31

See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992) (citing Bator, supra note 3,
at 478–99).
32
See id. at 305–06 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
33
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410–13 (2000).
34
See id. at 412–13. See also Carlos M. Vázquez, AEDPA as Forum-Allocation Rule 101–02 (Jan. 18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Vázquez, AEDPA as Forum-Allocation Rule].
35
See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390–91.
36
See id. at 385. See also Jordan M. Steiker, Habeas Corpus, ENCYC. OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE (2002), http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-andlaw/law/law/habeas-corpus.
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Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state criminal convictions.37 The
Court’s long-standing treatment of habeas and direct review as alternative mechanisms for providing the necessary federal review of
state criminal convictions invites an interpretation of AEDPA as
shifting back to the Supreme Court the responsibility for monitoring
state court decisions and granting relief for wrong but reasonable
state court convictions.38
At the same time, the Court’s reasons for shifting the responsibility for monitoring state court convictions to the lower federal
courts exposes the highly dysfunctional nature of AEDPA if understood as a forum-allocation device.39 The reasons that drove that
shift are just as applicable today as they were in 1953. The Court is
in no better position to fulfill an error-correction role with respect to
state criminal convictions today than it was then. If anything, allocating such a role to the Supreme Court would be even more dysfunctional today than it was in 1953.
I develop and critique the forum-allocation reading of AEDPA
elsewhere.40 This Article details the long history of treating habeas
for state prisoners as allocating among the federal courts the power
and responsibility for safeguarding the constitutional rights of persons convicted of crimes in state court. I show that, before Williams,
de novo federal review of legal and mixed questions decided by the
state courts in cases resulting in custody was always understood to
be necessary and that, between 1916 and 1953, the debate was not
about whether state prisoners’ constitutional claims should be relegated to state court; it was instead about whether federal review
should be undertaken in the Supreme Court or the lower federal
courts. The Court eventually concluded that it could not hope to
monitor state court compliance with the constitutional rights of state
court criminal defendants and accordingly expanded the lower federal courts’ power to do so via habeas.
37

141 CONG. REC. S7833 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(introducing an amendment titled “Stopping Abuse of Federal Collateral Remedies” and stating that “it should go without saying that there is always a review in
the U.S. Supreme Court from any decision of the highest court of a State. So there
is ultimately still the potential for Federal review of a State court decision.”).
38
See Vázquez, AEDPA as Forum-Allocation Rule, supra note 34, at 101.
39
See id. at 102.
40
See generally id.
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In Part I, I examine the period between the Founding and 1916,
when Congress amended the statute governing the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction over cases from the state courts, replacing its mandatory
writ of error jurisdiction with discretionary writ of certiorari jurisdiction. Until 1867, the habeas jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts did not generally extend to state prisoners.41 During this period, state prisoners were entitled to de novo review in the Supreme
Court of legal and mixed questions of federal law decided against
them in the state courts.42 Even after Congress extended the lower
federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to state prisoners, the Court interpreted the jurisdiction narrowly, channeling such cases to the Supreme Court. During this period, the Court regarded direct review
as the proper mechanism for ensuring state court protection of the
constitutional rights of persons convicted of crimes in state court.
In Part II, the heart of the Article, I examine the period between
1916 and the Court’s 1953 decision in Brown v. Allen. I show that
this was a transitional one marked by disagreement among the Justices about whether the responsibility for monitoring state court decisions resulting in custody should be allocated to the Court itself or
to the lower federal courts on habeas. The evolution of the Justices’
views on this question is reflected mainly in the decisions that gradually rejected the doctrine that a prior denial of certiorari should be
understood to reflect the Justices’ views on the merits of the legal
claims raised in the habeas petition. It is no accident that Brown v.
Allen, the decision that all recognize as adopting a de novo standard
of review of legal and mixed questions on habeas, was also the decision that made clear that a prior denial of certiorari deserved no
weight in the habeas calculus.43 The close link the Court perceived
between the two issues reflects the Court’s understanding of the forum-allocation function of habeas jurisdiction.
In Part III, I show that the Court continued to adhere to the de
novo standard of review until the enactment of AEDPA in 1996. I
review some of the limitations on habeas adopted by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts and show that, notwithstanding these limitations,
41

See infra text accompanying notes 57–59.
See infra text accompanying notes 55–56.
43
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
42
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the Court continued to recognize that federal review of state court
decisions resulting in custody was necessary to ensure that the state
courts “toe[d] the constitutional mark.”44 If the Court continues to
believe this, and if AEDPA bars the lower federal courts from granting habeas relief for some constitutional errors that otherwise would
warrant reversal of the conviction, then the Court will need to rethink its current approach to granting direct review to state prisoners
alleging constitutional violations.
I. THE 1789–1916 PERIOD
From the beginning of our history until after the Civil War, the
federal courts generally lacked jurisdiction to grants writs of habeas
corpus to persons in state custody.45 After the Civil War, the habeas
jurisdiction of the federal courts was extended to persons in state
custody, but, as discussed below, the Court articulated and enforced
extra-statutory rules according to which the federal courts were ordinarily to deny relief to persons who were being criminally tried or
had been convicted in the state courts.46 Nevertheless, during this
entire period, state prisoners had a right of access to the federal
courts for de novo review of questions of federal law and of application of such law to fact. State prisoners had access to the Supreme
Court, whose jurisdiction over federal questions decided in the state
courts against a federal right-holder was mandatory.47 The extrastatutory limits on the lower federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction were
justified by the Court on forum-allocation grounds: the proper forum
for reviewing state criminal convictions was the Supreme Court on
direct review, not the lower federal courts on collateral review.48

44

Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
45
See infra text accompanying notes 57–59.
46
See Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_habeas.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2017). See, e.g., Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879); Ex Parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251–52 (1886); In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 78 (1893).
47
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86. See generally
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, supra note 46.
48
See infra text accompanying notes 85–88.
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The Founders agreed that the Constitution should provide for
federal courts in order to ensure state compliance with federal law
and to protect federal rights.49 Some believed that the Constitution
should establish federal courts to adjudicate federal law in the first
instance.50 Others believed that it would be sufficient to provide for
Supreme Court review of state court decisions regarding federal
law.51 As a result of the well-known “Madisonian Compromise,”52
the Constitution created a Supreme Court and gave it jurisdiction to
review state court decisions on federal questions while also empowering Congress to create lower federal courts, if it desired, to hear
federal claims in the first instance.53 The Constitution’s default
mechanism for monitoring state court enforcement of federal law
was thus Supreme Court review of state court decisions on federal
questions.
The Constitution gave Congress the power to make exceptions
to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.54 Nevertheless, the Judiciary
Act of 1789 provided for mandatory Supreme Court review by writ
of error of state court decisions in which an asserted federal right or
privilege had been denied.55 Thus, from the beginning, persons convicted of a crime in state court—like all litigants in the state courts—
had a right to Supreme Court review of any federal claims or defenses they had raised that the state court had denied.56
Congress did not grant to the federal courts a general authority
to grant habeas relief to state prisoners until after the Civil War.57
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided:
49

See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6–7 (7th ed. 2015).
50
See id. at 7–9.
51
See id.
52
See id. at 8.
53
See id. at 18–19.
54
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2.
55
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86.
56
See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 406–12, 415–16 (1821) (holding
that Supreme Court review of such cases does not violate the Eleventh Amendment).
57
Pursuant to amendments enacted in 1833 and 1842, the federal courts did
have the authority to grant habeas relief (a) to persons in state or federal custody
“for any act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of any
order, process, or decree of any judge or court of the United States,” and (b) to
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[t]hat writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend
to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody,
under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court
of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court
to testify.58
As a result of this proviso, the federal courts were empowered to
grant habeas relief only to federal prisoners.59 The Judiciary Act of
1789 thus entitled persons convicted of crimes in state court to federal review of their convictions, but allocated the responsibility of
performing such review to the Supreme Court rather than the lower
federal courts.
In 1867, Congress amended the Judiciary Act to authorize habeas relief “in all cases where any person may be restrained of his
or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of
the United States . . . .”60 The amendment thus conferred jurisdiction
on the federal courts to grant habeas relief to persons in either state
or federal custody. The Supreme Court did not have occasion to interpret this provision until 1886,61 however, as Congress famously
repealed the section of the Act authorizing appeals to the Supreme
Court of the lower federal courts’ decisions under this Act.62
In Ex parte Royall, the first case to address the availability of
federal habeas relief for state prisoners after Congress restored the
Court’s jurisdiction over such appeals, the Court addressed the relation between the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions by persons in state custody and the Supreme Court’s
obligation to review federal questions arising in state court through
writ of error.63 Royall is best known for articulating what has since
“subjects or citizens of foreign states, in custody under National or State authority
for acts done or omitted by or under color of foreign authority, and alleged to be
valid under the law of nations.” Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 101–02 (1869).
58
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14.
59
The federal courts could only issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum
on behalf of persons in state custody.
60
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867).
61
See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 245 (1886).
62
See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514–15 (1868) (affirming constitutionality of repeal).
63
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 252–53.
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become known as the rule of exhaustion of state remedies.64 The
Court in Royall confirmed that the federal courts have the power
under the 1867 statutes to grant habeas relief to persons in state custody who are restrained of their liberty in violation of the Constitution, but went on to hold that the courts have discretion as to the time
and mode of exercising this power.65 “That discretion,” the Court
held,
should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the
judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and
in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to
guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.66
According to the Court, the federal courts should grant the writ
immediately in “cases of urgency,” such as those “involving the authority and operations of the General Government, or the obligations
of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations . . . .”67 But,
in the absence of “special circumstances requiring immediate action,” the court has discretion to remit the petitioner to the state
courts, which have an equal obligation to give effect to federal constitutional rights.68 What the Court in Royall held to be within the
courts’ discretion morphed in later cases into a requirement to exhaust state court remedies, which today is a statutory requirement.69
After state remedies have been exhausted, the Court in Royall
went on to state, the habeas court

64

See id. See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 49, at 1349–55.
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251–53.
66
Id. at 251.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 253.
69
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2006) (“An applicant shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of
this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented.”); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251–53.
65
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has still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing, the accused, if convicted, shall
be put to his writ of error from the highest court of
the State, or whether it will proceed, by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States.70
Again, however, what in Royall was left largely to the lower federal
court’s discretion morphed into a stricter requirement in later cases.
As the Court put it in In re Frederich,
the general rule and better practice, in the absence of
special facts and circumstances, is to require a prisoner who claims that the judgment of a state court
violates his rights under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, to seek a review thereof by writ of
error instead of resorting to the writ of habeas corpus.71
In Royall, the Court cited Ex parte Bridges as a case in which
the court had found it appropriate for the federal court to grant habeas relief after exhaustion, rather than remit the petitioner to his
writ of error.72
Adverting to the argument that where a defendant has
been regularly indicted, tried, and convicted in a
State court, his only remedy was to carry the judgment to the State court of last resort, and thence by
writ of error to this court, [Justice Bradley in
Bridges] said: “This might be so if the proceeding in
the State court was merely erroneous; but where it is
70

Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 253.
In re Frederich, 149 U.S. at 78; accord Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290–
91 (1898); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 (1896); Ex parte Fonda, 117
U.S. 516, 518 (1886); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 460 (1891); Wood v.
Brush, 140 U. S. 278, 289–90 (1891); Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291, 295–97
(1891); Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 (1892); New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89,
94 (1894); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100, 101 (1894); Bergemann v. Backer, 157
U.S. 655, 659 (1895).
72
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 253.
71
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void for want of jurisdiction, habeas corpus will lie,
and may be issued by any court or judge invested
with supervisory jurisdiction in such case.”73
Bradley was referring to the distinction, often invoked during this
period, “between an erroneous judgment, and one that is illegal or
void . . . .”74 As the Court put it in Ex parte Siebold,
[t]he only ground on which this court, or any court,
without some special statute authorizing it, will give
relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause,
or some other matter rendering its proceedings
void.75
The distinction between erroneous and void convictions was articulated in cases such as Siebold, which involved petitions for habeas corpus by persons in federal custody,76 but the Court came to
apply the distinction to habeas petitions by state prisoners.77 In addition to the rendering court’s lack of jurisdiction over the defendant
or the subject matter, the Court came to recognize, as among the
flaws that render a conviction void, the unconstitutionality of the
statute that the petitioner was convicted of violating or of the sentence imposed.78 The cases gradually expanding the types of errors
that render a criminal conviction void appear to base that conclusion
on the Court’s evaluation of the importance of the right that was
violated rather than any inherent characteristic of the state court’s
error.79 Be that as it may, the permissible grounds for granting habeas relief during this period were narrower than the grounds for
reversing a state court conviction on direct appeal.

73

Id.
Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879).
75
Id.
76
See generally id. at 373–75.
77
See, e.g., In re Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 70 (1893).
78
See Bator, supra note 3, at 468.
79
This is the position defended by Professor Liebman, who disputes Professor Bator’s claim that habeas review was available only if the rendering court
74
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Royall’s citation of Bridges suggested that cases in which the
state court judgment was void were among those in which remitting
the prisoner to his writ of error was not appropriate.80 Later cases,
however, made clear that, except in cases of urgency, a petitioner
would be left to his writ of error even in such cases.81 As Bridges
illustrates, the Court did occasionally uphold a grant of habeas relief
to a state prisoner, but, as the turn of the century approached, the
Court’s insistence on the exclusivity of recourse to the writ of error
grew more rigid,82 rendering largely moot the theoretical availability
of habeas to release state prisoners whose convictions were void.
Importantly, however, the Court’s curtailment of habeas relief
for state prisoners during this period did not mean that federal relief
for erroneously convicted state prisoners was unavailable.83 Such
prisoners had a right to direct review of their convictions in the Supreme Court.84 The cases limiting the availability of habeas relief
when writ of error review was available were explained in forumallocation terms. The Supreme Court was regarded as the more appropriate forum for the adjudication of such cases because of the
sensitivity of the reversal of a state criminal conviction that had been
upheld by the state’s highest court:
It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the
Federal courts by which a person under an indictment
in a state court and subject to its laws may, by the
decision of a single judge of the Federal court, upon
a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of the custody
of the officers of the State and finally discharged
therefrom, and thus a trial by the state courts of an
indictment found under the laws of a State be finally
prevented.85

lacked jurisdiction or if the petitioner was convicted under an unconstitutional law
or received an unconstitutional sentence. See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2041–48.
80
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
81
See, e.g., Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 284 (1898).
82
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2005, 2065–72.
83
See id. at 2070–73.
84
See id.
85
Baker, 169 U.S. at 291.
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It was considered unseemly for a single lower federal court to set a
state prisoner free and create “unnecessary conflict between courts
equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.”86 Only review in the Supreme Court would be consistent with
the dignity of the state courts and respect for their constitutional obligation to enforce federal rights.87 Confirming the forum-allocation
nature of these rules, the Court did allow the grant of habeas relief
in the few cases in which writ of error review was unavailable.88
II. THE 1916–1953 PERIOD
Beginning in 1916, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
over state court decisions denying federal rights began to shift from
being mandatory to being discretionary.89 In 1916, Congress for the
first time made Supreme Court review of some state court decisions
denying claims of federal rights discretionary.90 Writ of error review
was retained for state court decisions upholding “an authority exercised under any State” that had been challenged on federal grounds,
as well as decisions upholding state statutes challenged on federal
grounds or invalidating federal statutes or treaties on constitutional
grounds.91 In other cases raising federal questions, review was available only through the discretionary writ of certiorari.92 Congress restricted the scope of writ of error review further in 1925, retaining
such review only for decisions upholding state statutes challenged
on constitutional grounds or invalidating federal statutes or treaties
on constitutional grounds.93
Although some appeals of state criminal convictions continued
to fall within the categories of cases subject to mandatory Supreme
Court review under the 1916 and 1925 amendments to the Judiciary

86

New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 94 (1894).
See supra note 71.
88
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2073, 2076–81.
89
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 49, at 462.
90
See id.
91
See id. at 463 n.3.
92
See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1658 (2000).
93
Congress eliminated mandatory Supreme Court review of state courts decisions entirely in 1988. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 49, at 463.
87
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Act, they constituted only a small portion of the state criminal convictions that fell within the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction before
1916. Thus, after 1916, and especially after 1925, very few persons
convicted of crimes in state court were entitled, as a statutory matter,
to Supreme Court review of the federal issues that were decided
against them by the state courts.
All agree that de novo review was available to state prisoners via
habeas corpus at least as of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown
v. Allen in 1953.94 Thus, at least as of that date, federal habeas review filled the gap that was created by the elimination of mandatory
Supreme Court review via writ of error. The situation during the
decades before Brown v. Allen is a matter of some controversy, however.
The scope of federal habeas review in the decades before Brown
has been the subject of fierce debate among modern scholars. The
controversy is reflected in the highly charged exchange of dicta between Justice Thomas and Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West.95
One side of this debate, whose version of the pre-Brown history was
endorsed by Justice Thomas,96 relies heavily on the analysis of Professor Paul M. Bator in his influential article, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.97 This side
contends that, before Brown v. Allen, habeas review was available
only for claims that the state court lacked jurisdiction or denied a
full and fair hearing for the constitutional claim.98 The other side of
the debate, endorsed by Justice O’Connor in Wright v. West,99 was
developed by Justice Brennan in Fay v. Noia,100 and later defended
by Professor Gary Peller.101 This side contends that de novo review
of constitutional claims was always available on habeas and that
only the substantive protections provided by the Constitution in
94

See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
See also Bator, supra note 3, at 444–45.
95
See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 298–306 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment).
96
See id. at 285 (majority opinion).
97
See generally Bator, supra note 3.
98
See Wright, 505 U.S. at 285.
99
See id. at 304–05 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
100
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426–35 (1963).
101
See generally Peller, supra note 7, at 581–82, 616.
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criminal trials expanded over the years.102 More recently, Professor
James Liebman has argued that both Bator and Brennan/Peller got
certain aspects of the history wrong and has defended an intermediate position.103 Liebman maintains that the availability of habeas review of constitutional questions was limited when Supreme Court
review of state criminal convictions was mandatory, but became plenary when Supreme Court review became discretionary.104
Justice Frankfurter understated matters when he wrote in 1947
that the availability of habeas relief in the federal courts during this
period was “an untidy area” of the law.105 Nevertheless, the cases do
strongly support two interrelated theses. First, the period between
1916 and 1953 was a transitional period characterized by disagreement among the Justices about the appropriate scope of habeas review. Second, the debate among the Justices was not about the need
for meaningful federal review of state criminal convictions, but
about whether such review should take place in the Supreme Court
on direct review or in the lower federal courts via habeas corpus.
The need for meaningful review in some federal court was recognized on all sides; the disagreement was about the appropriate tribunal.
A. The Debate About the Scope of Habeas Review Before Brown
The opening salvo in the current debate about the scope of habeas review of state criminal convictions during this period came
from Professor Bator.106 Bator claimed that the basic rule during the
Nineteenth Century was that habeas relief was available only to
challenge the jurisdiction of the committing court, although he
acknowledged that the concept of “jurisdiction” was stretched to include the constitutionality of the law under which the petitioner was
convicted and the constitutionality of the sentence imposed,107 and
he acknowledged that some cases were difficult to reconcile with his
claim.108 According to Bator, the Court broadened the availability
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

See id. at 690–91.
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2093.
See id. at 2072–80, 2092–93.
Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See generally Bator, supra note 3.
See id. at 468, 483–84.
See id. at 470–71.
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of habeas review in Frank v. Magnum,109 holding that mob domination of the court and jury would be a cognizable claim on habeas if
the state court system failed to cure the problem by offering an untainted hearing.110 In his view, the Court in Moore v. Dempsey111
applied this standard and concluded that habeas relief was required
because the state had failed to provide an untainted hearing for the
claim of mob domination.112 According to Professor Bator, the
Court in Brown v. Allen radically expanded the availability of habeas relief by holding for the first time that habeas was available for
the relitigation of constitutional claims that had been fully and fairly
litigated in the state courts.113
Justice Brennan and Professor Peller, for their part, argued that
federal habeas jurisdiction was available for the relitigation of constitutional claims from the beginning.114 The Nineteenth Century denials of relief during earlier periods merely reflected the narrow
scope then given to substantive constitutional rights.115 The apparent
broadening of habeas relief reflected in Moore and then in Brown
actually resulted from the progressive broadening of constitutional
protections in the criminal sphere.116
Professor Liebman argues that both Bator and Peller get the history wrong in certain respects.117 Liebman argues that the 1867 statute always authorized review of constitutional issues decided by the
state courts, but only “where the writ is the only effective means of
109

See id. at 487, 523 (commenting on Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 329–
36 (1915)).
110
See id. at 486–87.
111
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90–92 (1923).
112
See Bator, supra note 3, at 488–91 (commenting on Moore, 261 U.S. at
90–92).
113
See id. at 500–01.
114
See Peller, supra note 7, at 581–82, 662–63. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 426 (1963) (“Congress in 1867 sought to provide a federal forum for state
prisoners having constitutional defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers
of the federal courts to their constitutional maximum. Obedient to this purpose,
we have consistently held that federal court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything that may
occur in the state court proceedings.”).
115
See Peller, supra note 7, at 616–22.
116
See id. at 643–49.
117
Liebman, supra note 8, at 2093.
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preserving his rights.”118 During the Nineteenth Century, habeas
was almost never necessary for this purpose, as any person convicted in the state courts had a right to Supreme Court review of any
federal questions decided against him by the state court.119 Thus, the
Court during this period established that federal habeas corpus was
not available as a substitute for writ of error review, holding that the
writ of error was the exclusive remedy.120 But, according to Liebman, the Court abandoned its rule treating writ of error review as
exclusive in the early Twentieth Century when its mandatory writ of
error jurisdiction came to be replaced by discretionary certiorari jurisdiction.121
The replacement of mandatory review with discretionary review
happened officially with the enactment of legislation amending the
statutes governing the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in
1916 and 1925,122 but Professor Liebman claims that the change began to occur “unofficially” shortly before that.123 Thus, he explains
Frank v. Magnum’s failure to rely on the exclusivity of writ of error
review in 1915 as resulting from the unofficial “certiorarification”
of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,124 and he argues that the Moore
v. Dempsey decision in 1923 was based on the statutory shift to certiorari review.125 The different outcomes in Frank and Moore, according to Liebman, are attributable to their differing conceptions of
the mob domination question.126 In Frank, the question was treated
as one of fact, as to which de novo habeas review does not extend;127
in Moore, the issue was treated as a mixed question subject to de
novo review.128 In Liebman’s view, de novo relitigation of legal and
118

Id. at 2055 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1943)).
See generally id. at 2068–73.
120
See Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 106 (1898). See also supra Part I.
121
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2075.
122
See id.
123
See id. at 2077–78.
124
See id. Professor Liebman was referring to the Court’s practice of dismissing writs of error summarily if they did not present a substantial federal question.
See id.
125
See id.
126
See id. at 2078–81.
127
See generally Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
128
Liebman, supra note 8, at 2078–81; see generally Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923).
119
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mixed questions on habeas has clearly been available since writ of
error review was replaced by certiorari review.129 The only significant change between Moore and Brown, in his view, was the increase in the number of federal constitutional rights applicable in
state criminal proceedings.130
Professors Bator and Peller both acknowledge that some of the
Court’s cases are in tension with their theories, as did Justice Brennan.131 Their disagreement was thus about the overall thrust of the
law during this period.132 Professor Liebman too recognizes that
some of the cases are difficult to reconcile with his theory.133 In particular, he recognizes that the Court took “time to come to grips with
the fact that the certioratification of its direct appeal docket made
the Royall compromise untenable,” and that, “[a]lthough Frank and
especially Moore adumbrated the Court’s eventual resolution, only
Brown forthrightly adopted it . . . .”134 As the cases discussed below
show, however, Brown was not a belated recognition of a change in
the Court’s direct review that had occurred many years earlier. Rather, the pre-Brown cases reflected the continued belief by the Court
129

See id. at 2075–81.
See id. at 2081–83.
131
Professor Bator admitted that the Court gave no “consideration to the
reaches and purposes of the habeas jurisdiction” between Frank and Brown and
that “some opinions [] could be taken to intimate that the writ automatically
reaches the merits of all federal constitutional questions.” Bator, supra note 3, at
496–97. Justice Brennan conceded that the Court did not hold to an “unwavering
line in its conclusions as to the availability of the Great Writ,” and that the availability of writ of error review prior to 1916 was “a powerful influence against the
allowance of [habeas review for] . . . state prisoners . . . .” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 411–13 (1963). Finally, in examining how denials of certiorari foreclosed
habeas review of state-prisoner claims between Frank and Brown, Professor
Peller explains that “Hawk and its progeny invited the federal habeas courts to
give substantive weight to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari,” but that the
lower courts at the time either “gave no weight to the Court’s denial[s]” or were
in fact deferring to the Supreme Court, rather than the state courts. Peller, supra
note 7, at 660–61.
132
See Peller, supra note 7, at 662–63.
133
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2083 (noting that, although “some preBrown cases assumed or concluded that the Court’s denial of certiorari did not
supply the statutorily mandated review as of right . . . [o]ther decisions did give
the denial of certiorari effect . . . .”).
134
Id.
130
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(or some Justices), long after the Court had adopted a highly discretionary approach reviewing state court decisions on other matters,
that the Supreme Court had a duty to review the constitutional
claims of persons convicted of crimes in state court.
Professor Liebman is correct in arguing that the federal courts’
habeas jurisdiction expanded to fill the gap in federal review left by
the certiorarification of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.135 But the cases show that this certiorarification took considerably longer to take hold with respect to state court decisions resulting in criminal convictions than in other cases. Well after 1916, a
majority of Justices continued to adhere to the Court’s pre-1916
view that the sensitive task of reviewing state court convictions and
possibly releasing a state prisoner whose conviction had been affirmed by the highest state courts was a task solely for the Supreme
Court itself to perform. Only when the Court came to realize that it
could no longer hope to fulfill this error-correction role did the Court
definitively abandon the pre-1916 preference for direct review as the
exclusive mechanism for reviewing state court convictions. The
Court wavered on this point in the years immediately preceding
Brown. The Court’s definitive abandonment of its insistence on direct review as the preferred mechanism for reviewing state court
convictions is reflected in its holding in Brown that denials of certiorari do not reflect the Justices’ views on the merits of the petitioners’ federal claims. The Court’s holding in Brown that habeas courts
should apply a de novo standard in deciding questions of law and
mixed questions of law and fact was directly related to its holding
that the Court’s denial of certiorari should be given no weight by
federal courts adjudicating habeas petitions.
B. The Court’s Gradual Expansion of Habeas Review Between
1916 and 1953
Professor Liebman is clearly right to note that habeas relief was
generally unavailable when a state prisoner had a right to direct review in the Supreme Court via writ of error. He also convincingly
shows that, after the shift from mandatory to discretionary direct review, the Court abandoned pre-1916 limits on the availability of ha-

135

See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2083, 2092.
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beas relief in direct response to the more limited availability of direct review of state criminal convictions in the Supreme Court. But
this shift did not occur on or around 1916. The shift was more gradual and only completed with the Brown decision in 1953.
1. THE COURT’S CONTINUED APPLICATION OF PRE-1916 LIMITS
In the early post-1916 cases, the Court continued to invoke and
apply the proposition that habeas relief is available only if the state
court lacked jurisdiction or if for other reasons its judgment was
void. In Knewal v. Egan, for example, the Court wrote that “[i]t is
the settled rule of this court that habeas corpus calls in question only
the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is challenged.”136 As
late as 1938, the Court was continuing to recite this limit on habeas
relief. Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court explained that “habeas
corpus cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities—not involving the question of jurisdiction—occurring
during the course of trial; and ‘the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
used as a writ of error.’”137
At the same time, the Court expanded the concept of jurisdictional errors to include errors that are not jurisdictional in any
straightforward sense. Thus, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court concluded that a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the course of a trial “stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.”138 The
Court’s characterization of this defect as a jurisdictional one appears
to have followed, in the Court’s analysis, from its view that the denial of habeas relief for this type of error would have left the victim
of a constitutional error remediless: “To deprive a citizen of his only
effective remedy would not only be contrary to the ‘rudimentary demands of justice’ but destructive of a constitutional guaranty specifically designed to prevent injustice.”139 The Court appears to have
concluded that any violation of constitutional rights was a “jurisdictional” defect warranting habeas relief, reasoning that, “[s]ince the
136
See Knewel v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925) (citing, inter alia, Frank,
237 U.S. at 327).
137
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (citing, inter alia, Knewal,
268 U.S. 442) (quoting Woolsey v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2 (1936)).
138
Id. at 468.
139
Id. at 467 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
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Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime
to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional
mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”140 That the
Court had reached this understanding of a “jurisdictional” defect,
and thus of the available scope of habeas relief, is confirmed by its
decision the following term in Bowen v. Johnston.141 After again reciting that “[t]he scope of review on habeas corpus is limited to the
examination of the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment of conviction is challenged,”142 the Court went on to state: “But if it be
found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner, or that
in its proceedings his constitutional rights have been denied, the
remedy of habeas corpus is available.”143
The Court abandoned the “jurisdictional” limitation with respect
to claims of constitutional error a few years later in Waley v. Johnston. The Court stated:
[T]he use of the writ in the federal courts to test the
constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not
restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial
court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of
the constitutional rights of the accused, and where
the writ is the only effective means of preserving his
rights.144
Professor Liebman argues that this had been the rule all along.145
State court convictions infected with constitutional error had always
been understood to be “void,” but, when the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions was mandatory, habeas

140

Id. at 467.
See Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939).
142
Id. at 23 (citing, inter alia, Knewal, 268 U.S. at 445).
143
Id. at 24 (citing, inter alia, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923);
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467) (emphasis added).
144
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1943).
145
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2055.
141

2017]

HABEAS AS FORUM ALLOCATION

671

review was not “the only effective means of preserving [the prisoner’s] rights.”146 When the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction became
discretionary, he argues, this rationale for denying habeas relief
evaporated and habeas relief became widely available.147
The cases discussed above, however, indicate that the “jurisdictional” category came to encompass constitutional errors only gradually. The demise of the preference for direct review of state criminal convictions also occurred more gradually. Indeed, the Court in
Waley itself hinted at this latter limitation when it noted that habeas
relief was appropriate in the case because “[t]he facts relied on are
dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to
consideration and review on appeal.”148 This qualification suggests
the Court’s continued adherence to the belief that habeas should not
be used as a substitute for direct review in the Supreme Court.
Earlier post-1916 cases are more explicit in asserting the exclusivity of direct review, even in cases that did not appear to fall within
the scope of the Court’s narrowed mandatory jurisdiction.149 Thus,
in Craig v. Hecht, decided in 1923, the Court affirmed the denial of
habeas relief on the ground that “[t]he Circuit Court of Appeals correctly applied the well-established general rule that a writ of habeas
corpus cannot be utilized for the purpose of proceedings in error.”150
And in Goto v. Lane, decided the following year, the Court affirmed
the denial of habeas relief on the ground that:
If [the court in which the petitioner was convicted]
erred in determining [federal law], its judgment was
not for that reason void . . . but subject to correction
in regular course on writ of error. If the questions
presented involved the application of constitutional
principles, that alone did not alter the rule. And, if the
petitioners permitted the time within which a review
on writ of error might be obtained to elapse and
thereby lost the opportunity for such a review, that
146

See Waley, 316 U.S. at 105.
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2055–57, 2075–83.
148
Waley, 316 U.S. at 104.
149
See, e.g., Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277 (1923); Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S.
393, 402 (1924).
150
Craig, 263 U.S. at 277.
147
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gave no right to resort to habeas corpus as a substitute.151
In United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, decided in 1925, the Court
wrote:
In so far as [the petitioner’s claims] involve treaty or
constitutional rights, [the state] courts are as competent as the federal courts to decide them. In the regular and ordinary course of procedure, the power of
the highest state court in respect of such questions
should first be exhausted. When that has been done,
the authority of this court may be invoked to protect
a party against any adverse decision involving a denial of a federal right properly asserted by him.152
As late as the early 1940’s, the lower federal courts understood
the Supreme Court’s doctrine on this question to be that “[w]hen [a
state prisoner] has exhausted the judicial remedies afforded by the
State and has secured a decision from its highest court, his sole recourse will be to invoke the authority of the Supreme Court of the
United States ‘to protect . . . against any adverse decision involving
a denial of a federal right properly asserted . . . .’”153
[I]n view of the delicate question of interference by
inferior Federal courts with the judgment of the
courts of a sovereign state of the Union which is presented by an application [for habeas corpus], it appears to be the approved practice that if such an application is to be presented after exhaustion of the
State judicial remedies, it should be made directly to
the Supreme Court of the United States.154
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Ex parte Hawk, in
1944, citing the foregoing lower court cases and others to the same
151

Goto, 265 U.S. at 402 (1924) (internal citations omitted).
United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925).
153
Hawk v. Olson, 130 F.2d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1942) (quoting Kennedy, 269
U.S. at 17).
154
Kramer v. Nevada, 122 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1941).
152
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effect, apparently with approval.155 The Court stated that, “[w]here
the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of his
contentions, and this Court has either reviewed or declined to review
the state court’s decision, a federal court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated.”156
The Court did qualify this rule:
[W]here resort to state court remedies has failed to
afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either because the state affords no
remedy, or because in the particular case the remedy
afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable
or seriously inadequate, a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be
remediless.157
These exceptions appear to align with Professor Bator’s view of the
limited nature of federal habeas relief before Brown.158
These cases are thus in tension with Professor Liebman’s claim
that habeas review of constitutional issues became generally available at the time of, and as a result of, the certiorarification of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction just before 1916.159 Even well
after the Court’s mandatory review by writ of error was replaced by
discretionary certiorari review, the Court continued to express the
view that review of state criminal convictions should ordinarily occur in the Supreme Court on direct review rather than on collateral
review through habeas corpus.160
Nevertheless, the cases support a forum-allocation understanding of habeas jurisdiction. As shown below, the Court determined
the availability of habeas jurisdiction based on its views regarding
the proper federal forum for reviewing state criminal convictions.161
The limitations on the availability of habeas relief during this period
155

Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116–17 (1944).
Id. at 118.
157
Id.
158
See Bator, supra note 3, at 463.
159
See Liebman, supra note 8, at 2075–80.
160
See, e.g., Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277 (1923); see also Goto v. Lane,
265 U.S. 393, 402 (1924).
161
See infra Part II.B.b.
156
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did not reflect the view that state prisoners convicted as a result of
constitutional error should nevertheless remain in prison. The
Court’s continuing insistence that review of state criminal convictions take place in the Supreme Court reflected its view that the Supreme Court itself was the appropriate forum for monitoring state
court decisions resulting in custody, and that the Court remained capable of doing so. Gradually, as the constitutional rights of prisoners
expanded and the number of cases increased, the Court reached the
conclusion that it could no longer fulfill that role.162 It is no coincidence that Brown v. Allen, the case that all agree affirmed the right
to relitigate constitutional issues through habeas, was also the case
in which the Court for the first time definitely held that a federal
habeas court should give no weight to the Supreme Court’s previous
denial of state prisoner’s petition for certiorari.163
Today, the Supreme Court grants a minuscule proportion of the
petitions for certiorari presented to it.164 It selects cases presenting
important, broadly applicable issues in which the lower courts or the
state courts have reached conflicting decisions.165 A petition arguing
that the court below has made a case-specific constitutional error
will rarely, if ever, be granted.166 If the Court had applied that standard during the years immediately following 1916, then many convictions vitiated by constitutional error would have remained unremedied as a result of the Court’s insistence that such convictions
should ordinarily be reviewed by the Court itself or not at all. But,
the Court did not apply today’s certiorari standard to certiorari petitions by state prisoners until well after 1916.167

162

See id. at 2080.
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97, 507 (1953).
164
See, e.g., The Statistics: The Supreme Court 2014 Term, 129 HARV. L. REV.
381, 389 (2015) (noting that in 2014 the Court only granted review for one percent
of the petitions before it).
165
See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 239 (10th ed.
2013). See also SUP. CT. R. 10.
166
See id. (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law.”) (internal quotation marks removed).
167
See id.
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2. THE COURT’S EARLY APPROACH TO CERTIORARI
The main advocate of limiting writ of error review and expanding certiorari review was the Supreme Court itself, principally Chief
Justice Taft.168 In advocating this change, the Justices assured Congress that it would exercise its discretion with particular attention to
its responsibility to protect constitutional rights.169 As far as the Justices’ statements to Congress revealed, Professor Hartnett writes,
the only use envisioned in constitutional cases was as
a way of quickly dealing with claims that were either
frivolous or plainly governed by precedent—that is,
in cases where the lower court was obviously correct
and summary affirmance would be appropriate. Taft
expressed confidence that in no case “would a constitutional question of any real merit or doubt escape
our review by the method of certiorari,” explaining
that the restrictions were merely “to keep out constitutional questions that have really no weight or have
been fully decided in previous cases and that have
only been projected into the case for the purpose of
securing delay or a reconsideration of questions the
decision of which has already become settled
law.”170
Consistent with this legislative history, the rule the Court
adopted at the time to guide the exercise of its discretion with respect
to certiorari differed substantially from the present rule.171 Today’s
rule reflects the Court’s focus on ensuring uniformity in the interpretation of federal law.172 The factors it takes into account in granting certiorari include only the existence of a conflict in the interpretation of federal law among the courts of appeals or the state courts

168

See Hartnett, supra note 92, at 1660–72, 1666 n.101, 1715.
See id. at 1715.
170
Id.
171
Compare SUP. CT. R. 10 with William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 75 YALE L.J. 1,3 n.4 (1925).
172
See SUP. CT. R. 10.
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and the importance of the legal question.173 The current rule also
makes clear that “[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted
when the asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law.”174
The 1925 version of the rule differed in important respects. According to the earlier rule, the “reasons which will be considered” in
determining whether to grant certiorari included that “a state court
has decided a federal question of substance . . . in a way probably
not in accord with applicable decisions of this court.”175 As written,
the rule suggests that the Court at that time understood its role, with
respect to cases coming from the state courts, to include an errorcorrection function. This would be consistent with the assurances
the Chief Justice provided to Congress in advocating the shift to certiorari review.176 Under this standard, a denial of certiorari in a case
coming from the state courts might be understood to reflect a determination by at least six Justices that the underlying constitutional
question had—in the Chief Justice’s words—“no weight” or had
been “projected into the case for the purpose of securing delay or a
173

See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 165, at 239. Rule 10 lists the following
three factors:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an important
federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state
court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s
supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another
state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided
an important question of federal law that has not been, but
should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important
federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions
of this Court.
SUP. CT. R. 10.
174
SUP. CT. R. 10.
175
See SUP. CT. R. 35.5(a), 266 U.S. 681 (1924). See also Taft, supra note 171,
at 3 n.4.
176
See supra text accompanying note 170.
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reconsideration of questions the decision of which has already become settled law.”177
Whether the Court in fact exercised its discretion in this way
with respect to requests for review from persons convicted of crimes
in state court is difficult to demonstrate directly. Since the Court
does not explain its reasons for denying certiorari, it is difficult to
establish definitively that such denials were tantamount to a determination on the merits that the underlying claim lacked merit. Nevertheless, there is indirect support in the Justices’ opinions for the
proposition that, at least in the early years after the shift from mandatory to discretionary jurisdiction, the Justices so understood its
denials of certiorari to petitions filed by state prisoners.
As noted above, the early cases, up to and including Ex parte
Hawk, reveal that, in the absence of exceptional urgency warranting
a departure from the usual exhaustion rules, the Court insisted that
state prisoners seek direct review in the Supreme Court and that, if
the Court denied review, a lower federal court should ordinarily
deny a subsequent habeas petition.178 In support of this procedure,
the Court cited pre-1916 cases that, in turn, made clear that the exclusivity of writ of error review was not just a matter of judicial efficiency.179 The rule was also based on the notion that reversing a
state criminal conviction that had been upheld by the states’ highest
courts was a delicate matter.180 It was thought to be unseemly for a
single federal judge to set at liberty a duly convicted prisoner who
had received several layers of review in the state courts.181 The
Court’s forum-allocation rule was thus based on the conviction that,
of the two available avenues for reviewing state criminal convictions, direct review in the Supreme Court was superior from the
standpoint of federal-state relations and respect for the dignity of
state courts, and that the lower federal courts should accordingly
grant habeas relief only in cases of peculiar urgency.182
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See Hartnett, supra note 92, at 1731 n.488.
See supra text accompanying notes 148–160.
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See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925)
(citing, inter alia, Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898)).
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See Baker, 169 U.S. at 291; Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 (1892).
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See supra notes 84–87, 148–60.
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The Court’s continuing invocation of this preference after 1916
means that the Court believed that this rationale retained force despite the shift to discretionary review. This choice between two remedies available in federal court makes sense only if direct review
offered a realistic avenue for correcting the errors that would otherwise be corrected in the lower federal courts on habeas. The idea
was that it was the Supreme Court’s obligation to monitor state court
compliance with federal law in criminal cases. And because “ought”
presupposes “can,” the Court’s adherence to this allocation of jurisdiction reflects the Justices’ views that fulfilling this role was possible for the Court.
3. POST-HAWK EROSION OF PREFERENCE FOR DIRECT REVIEW
The Court’s decisions after Ex parte Hawk show the gradual erosion of the pre-1916 limits on habeas review. At the same time, these
cases provide additional support for the claim that these limits were
continuously applied well into the 1916–1953 period. The postHawk decisions wavered on whether a request for direct review in
the Supreme Court should be a pre-requisite for seeking habeas corpus in the lower federal courts. Moreover, the opinions in these cases
show that the Justices who insisted on that requirement did so out of
a belief, based on the dignitary concerns mentioned earlier, that reviewing a state conviction and possibly releasing a state prisoner
was a role for the Supreme Court and not the lower federal courts.
The cases show that, until at least the mid-1940s, these Justices believed the Supreme Court had a “duty of passing upon charges of
state violations of federal constitutional rights” in such cases.183
Gradually, the contrary view came to prevail. The debate between the Justices in these later cases sheds useful light on the rationale supporting the narrower availability of habeas review in the
earlier period, as well as the rationale for dropping those limits. The
limits were dropped because the Justices came to recognize that, in
light of the Supreme Court’s increasing caseload, the Court could
no longer hope to fulfill an error correction function, even in the
subcategory of cases consisting of requests for direct review by state
prisoners.184
183
184

Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 216 (1950).
See infra text accompanying notes 228–243.
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Four years after Ex parte Hawk, the Court in Wade v. Mayo relaxed the requirement that a habeas petitioner must seek direct review of his claims in the Supreme Court. The majority quoted the
relevant passage from Ex parte Hawk, and agreed that:
Considerations of prompt and orderly procedure in
the federal courts will often dictate that direct review
be sought first in this Court. And where a prisoner
has neglected to seek that review, such failure may
be a relevant consideration for a district court in determining whether to entertain a subsequent habeas
corpus petition.185
Nevertheless, the Court declined to adopt a “hard and fast rule”
requiring a prior request for direct review in the Supreme Court.186
The majority cited “the volume of this Court’s business,”187 and said
that “[m]atters relevant to the exercise of our certiorari discretion
frequently result in denials of the writ without any consideration of
the merits.”188 “Where it is apparent or even possible” that the Court
would deny the petition for certiorari for reasons that do not reflect
its views of the merits of the underlying claim, “failure to file a petition should not prejudice the right to file a habeas corpus application in a district court.”189 The Court concluded that “it [was] reasonably certain” that the petition for certiorari had been denied because of doubts about whether the state court judgment rested on an
adequate state ground.190
The majority’s analysis shows that even the Justices in favor of
relaxing the requirement understood that a denial of certiorari in
cases seeking review of state court convictions sometimes reflected
the Justices’ views of the merits, and they appeared to require a
showing of at least a possibility that such was not the case. But these
Justices were willing to relax the requirement because, by this time,
in their view, denials of certiorari “frequently” did not reflect the
185
186
187
188
189
190

Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 680 (1948).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 682.
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Justices’ views of the merits and, in light of the volume of the
Court’s business, “[g]ood judicial administration is not furthered by
insistence on futile procedure.”191
Writing for four Justices, Justice Reed strenuously dissented.192
According to the dissenting Justices, “wise administration commands that this Court be asked, by appeal or certiorari, to pass upon
the federal constitutional questions presented. It is only by such a
procedure that the validity of state criminal conviction can be expeditiously and finally adjudicated.”193 Justice Reed elaborated:
[W]henever a prisoner brings a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal courts challenging collaterally a conviction in the state courts and asking
release from state custody, serious questions of the
relation between the federal and state judicial structures are raised. “It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the federal courts, by which a person
under an indictment in a state court, and subject to its
laws, may, by a decision of a single judge of a federal
court, upon a writ of habeas corpus, be taken out of
the custody of the officers of the state and finally discharged therefrom . . . .” Respect for the theory and
practice of our dual system government requires that
federal courts intervene by habeas corpus in state
criminal prosecutions only in exceptional circumstances.194
Justice Reed referred to appeal and certiorari as “the normal paths
of review” which, when “open to correct federal constitutional errors in state criminal proceedings,” bear upon the desirability of limiting the habeas corpus power of federal courts in respect of state
criminal prosecutions.195
191

Id. at 681.
See id. at 684–98 (Reed, J., dissenting).
193
Id. at 687 (Reed, J., dissenting).
194
Id. at 691 (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291
(1898)).
195
Id. at 692 (Reed, J., dissenting). See also id. at 694 (“Where there is a denial
of constitutional rights by the highest court of a state, a remedy exists by direct
review in this Court.”).
192
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It is not seemly that years after a conviction, when
time has dulled memories, when death has stilled
tongues, when records are unavailable, convicted felons, unburdened by any handicap to a normal presentation of any claim of unfairness in their trial, should
be permitted to attack their sentences collaterally by
habeas corpus because of errors, known to them at
the time of trial.196
Although Justice Reed did not directly state that a denial of certiorari ordinarily reflects the Justices’ view that the petitioner’s
claims are unmeritorious, this appears to be the implication of his
insistence that the availability of certiorari review—the “normal”
“remedy” for constitutional errors in the state courts—should ordinarily preclude habeas relief,197 despite his agreement that the writ
of habeas corpus is “a proper procedure ‘to safeguard the liberty of
all persons . . . against infringement through any violation of the
Constitution.’”198 That this was his view is confirmed by his written
opinion for the majority in Darr v. Burford, discussed below.199
Between the decisions in Wade v. Mayo and Darr v. Burford,
Congress amended the habeas statute.200 The amendment codified
the exhaustion rule of Ex parte Hawk in the following terms:
Sec. 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, or that there is either an ab-
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Id. at 695 (Reed, J., dissenting).
See id. at 690–92.
198
Id. at 690 (Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309,
331 (1915)).
199
See generally Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
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See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952) (originally enacted as the Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2016)).
Congress enacted the amendment just two days after the decision in Wade v. Mayo
came down, so Congress did not take the decision into account in its deliberations.
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sence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State,
within the meaning of this section, if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented.201
Although the amendment did not refer to direct review in the
Supreme Court, the chairman of the committee appointed by the Judicial Conference of the United States to propose the amendment
ultimately adopted, Judge John Parker of the Fourth Circuit, explained that its primary purpose was to ensure that review of state
criminal convictions should take place solely in the Supreme Court
except in exceptional circumstances:
The thing in mind in the drafting of this section was
to provide that review of state court action be had so
far as possible only by the Supreme Court of the
United States, whose review of such action has historical basis, and that review not be had by the lower
federal courts, whose exercise of such power is unseemly and likely to breed dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction.202
The amendment accomplished this goal through its final clause:
The effect of this last provision is to eliminate, for all
practical purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal courts for habeas corpus in all states in which
successive applications may be made for habeas corpus to the state courts; for, in all such states, the applicant has the right, notwithstanding the denial of
prior applications, to apply again to the state courts
for habeas corpus and to have action upon such later
201

Id. (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2016)).
Hon. John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171,
176 (1948).
202
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application reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States on application for certiorari.203
According to Judge Parker, the holding of Wade v. Mayo would
now “be in the teeth of” the habeas statute.204 As Parker described
the effect of the amendment,
[t]here is preserved in full the right of persons imprisoned under judgments of state and federal courts
to ask release on the ground that they have been denied the sort of trial guaranteed by the Constitution;
but effective provision is made against the unseemly
incidents which have arisen in the assertion of the
right . . . .[T]here should be no more cases where proceedings of state courts, affirmed by the highest
courts of the state, with denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States, will be reviewed
by federal circuit or district judges.205
Judge Parker did not expressly state that the amendment presupposed that Supreme Court denials of certiorari reflected the Justices’
view that the underlying claims were unmeritorious, but that is a fair
inference from his statement that the amendment would avoid the
“unseemly conflicts of jurisdiction which have arisen under recent
habeas corpus decisions, without in anywise impairing the rights
which it was the purpose of those decisions to protect.”206
The Court relied in part on this amendment, and quoted Judge
Parker’s article at length, when it reversed Wade v. Mayo in Darr v.
Burford and reimposed a rigid requirement of prior request for Supreme Court review via certiorari (in the absence of exceptional circumstances warranting a departure from the exhaustion requirement).207 Justice Reed’s opinion for the Court in Darr explained the
theory underlying the rule in greater depth.208 Again, Justice Reed
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Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Darr, 339 U.S. at 210–14, 212–13 n.34.
See id. at 206–07.

684

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:645

quoted Brice v. Grice regarding the “exceedingly delicate jurisdiction” by which a single federal judge is empowered to release a state
prisoner,209 adding that “[t]he jurisdiction is more delicate, the reason against its exercise stronger, when a single judge is invoked to
reverse the decision of the highest court of a State in which the constitutional rights of a prisoner could have been claimed . . . .”210
For this reason,
It is this Court’s conviction that orderly federal procedure under our dual system of government demands that the state’s highest courts should ordinarily be subject to reversal only by this Court and that
a state’s system for the administration of justice
should be condemned as constitutionally inadequate
only by this Court.211
The Court referred to “[t]he responsibility to intervene in state criminal matters,” which “rests primarily upon this Court,”212 explaining
that state prisoners should be required to seek direct review because
“[t]he opportunity to meet that constitutional responsibility should
be afforded.”213 Justice Reed also referred to the Supreme Court’s
“duty of passing upon charges of state violations of federal constitutional rights.”214 If the Justices have a “responsibility” and a
“duty” to pass upon constitutional questions that arise in state criminal cases, and if that is the basis for limiting the discretion of the
lower federal courts from doing so, then the Court’s disposition of
petitions for certiorari by state prisoners must reflect the Justices’
views on the underlying merits of their claims.
By the time of Darr v. Burford, it is likely that these views were
those of a minority of the Court. Justice Reed purported to be leaving open the question of “what effect the lower federal courts should
accord a denial of certiorari by this Court when the state prisoner
209

Id. at 206 (quoting Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898)).
Id. at 207 (quoting Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 187 (1899)).
211
Id. at 217. See also id. at 216 (“It is this Court which ordinarily should
reverse state court judgments concerning local criminal administration.”).
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Id. at 216.
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later applies for federal habeas corpus.”215 Justice Frankfurter’s dissent understood Reed to be taking the position that the lower courts
should treat a denial of certiorari as a decision on the merits.216
Based on the excerpts from Reed’s opinion quoted above, Frankfurter’s reading of Reed’s opinion was well grounded. Justice Reed’s
denial of Frankfurter’s characterization of his views was only partial: he conceded that a denial of certiorari might reflect doubts about
whether the underlying decision rested on adequate state grounds,
and suggested that the lower courts should be free to reach the merits
of the habeas petition when the Court includes “an express direction
that the petitioner may proceed in the federal district court without
prejudice from the denial of his petition for certiorari.”217 In the end,
Reed purported to leave that question open.218
But, more importantly, two members of the majority filed a concurring opinion indicating that they joined Justice Reed’s opinion
“except for any indication it may contain that, although the reasons
for a denial of certiorari are not stated, they nevertheless may be
inferred from the record.”219 In the view of Justices Burton and
Clark, “when the reasons for a denial of certiorari are not stated, the
denial should be disregarded in passing upon a subsequent application for relief except to note that this source of possible relief has
been exhausted.”220 It thus appears that a majority of the Court (the
four dissenters and the two concurring Justices) had by this time
concluded that a denial of certiorari did not ordinarily reflect the
view that the underlying claims were unmeritorious. The views expressed by Justice Reed are nevertheless important—not because
they reflect the views of a majority of the Court in 1950, but because
they explain the rationale for the rule the Court adhered to until at
least 1944.
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Id. at 214.
See id.; id. at 224–27 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 214–16 (majority opinion).
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Id. at 214 (stating “[t]he issue of the effect of such a denial apparently could
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In view of the concurring opinion of Burton and Clark, it is fair
to infer that the views of a majority of the Court in 1950 regarding
the meaning of a denial of certiorari filed by a state prisoner are reflected in Justice Frankfurter’s lengthy dissenting opinion in
Darr.221 Frankfurter explained that the majority’s principal error
was to treat the writ of certiorari as if it served the same function as
the writ of error, when in fact the two are very different:
A writ of error was a writ of right. It makes all the
difference in the world whether a prisoner knocks at
the door of this Court to invoke its grace or has unquestioned access for the final determination of the
federal question as to which the highest court of the
State was merely an intermediate tribunal . . . .In the
writ of error cases this Court held habeas corpus in
the lower federal courts ought not to take the place of
a mandatory appeal. But this jurisdictional situation
was drastically changed by the Act of September 6,
1916, 39 Stat. 726, and the Act of February 13, 1925,
43 Stat. 936 . . . .After this shift from review as of
right to review by grace, it could no longer be said
that a litigant forwent his right to have this Court review and reverse a State court. The right was gone.
Only an opportunity—and a slim one—remained. It
completely misconceives the doctrine which required a case to be brought to this Court by writ of
error, because it was the duty of this Court to adjudicate the claim on the merits, to apply it to the totally
different factors involved in certiorari.222
In arguing that state prisoners should not be required to seek certiorari before petitioning for habeas corpus,223 Frankfurter noted the
variety reasons for denying certiorari, “which precludes the implication that were the case here the merits would go against the petitioner.”224 In Justice Frankfurter’s words:
221
222
223
224

Id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 235 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 227(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Petitions may have been denied because, even
though serious constitutional questions were
raised, it seemed to at least six members of the Court
that the issue was either not ripe enough or too moribund for adjudication; that the question had better
await the perspective of time or that time would soon
bury the question or, for one reason or another, it was
desirable to wait and see; or that the constitutional
issue was entangled with nonconstitutional issues
that raised doubt whether the constitutional issue
could be effectively isolated; or for various other reasons not relating to the merits.225
This approach to certiorari, Frankfurter explained, was a necessary one. “It must be so unless the whole conception of certiorari in
relation to the business of this Court is to be radically transformed.”226 “The most weighty considerations of practical administration counsel against” requiring state prisoners to seek relief in
the Supreme Court.227 Given the Court’s “increasing subjection of
[s]tate convictions to federal judicial review through the expanded
concept of due process” during the previous twenty years,228 and the
resulting “flood of habeas corpus cases,”229 a requirement that state
prisoners seek relief in the Supreme Court would mean that “[t]he
burden of the Court’s volume of business will be greatly increased . . . .”230
Additionally, for a variety of reasons, the district courts are better placed to address these claims than is the Supreme Court. First,
“cases involving federal claims by State prisoners . . . frequently
involve questions of State law which must be answered before the
federal issue can be reached,”231 and the district courts are better
situated to address such issues.232 Additionally, the Supreme Court
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232

Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 226 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 229 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 221 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 235 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 229 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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“can dispose of [these cases] only as a matter of abstract pleading,”
whereas “[t]he District Courts . . . can hold hearings when deemed
appropriate, consider allegations on their merits if they are at all substantial and dispose of what often turn out to be unmeritorious
claims.”233 For all of these reasons, “[i]n the present context of the
Court’s business in relation to these cases—their volume and the
required knowledge of local law with which the local federal judges
are much more familiar than we can possibly be—all considerations
of policy” support the conclusion that these cases belong in the district courts rather than the Supreme Court.234
In sum, Frankfurter’s dissent in Darr rests squarely on the recognition that the Supreme Court could no longer effectively monitor
state court compliance with federal constitutional law in the “flood”
of criminal appeals resulting from the expansion of the constitutional limits on state criminal proceedings, as well as on “policy”
considerations making the lower federal courts the better forum for
deciding these cases. Frankfurter’s arguments regarding the meaning of a denial of certiorari seem self-evident to any observer of Supreme Court practice in 2017. What is noteworthy, however, is that
these views are articulated in a dissenting opinion in 1950, thirtyfour years after the shift from writ of error to certiorari review.235
Although it is possible that these views commanded the support of
a majority of the Court by this time, the Court appears to have arrived at the conclusions reached by Justice Frankfurter only gradually.
The question of the weight to be given by habeas courts to the
Supreme Court’s prior denial of certiorari was finally settled three
years later in Brown v. Allen.236 In holding that such denials should
be given no weight, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for a majority repeated some of the same arguments found in his Darr dissent.237 For
example, he elaborated on the reasons making the district courts
233

Id.
Id. at 236 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
235
See supra text accompanying note 90.
236
See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489–97 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.). Darr’s holding that habeas was available only if the petitioner had previously
sought direct review in the Supreme Court through certiorari was not reversed
until 1963. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 391 (1963).
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See Brown, 344 U.S. at 489–97 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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more appropriate fora than the Supreme Court for deciding these
cases:
These petitions for certiorari are rarely drawn by lawyers; some are almost unintelligible and certainly do
not present a clear statement of issues necessary for
our understanding, in view of the pressure of the
Court’s work. The certified records we have in the
run of certiorari cases to assist understanding are almost unknown in this field. Indeed, the number of
cases in which most of the papers necessary to prove
what happened in the State proceedings are not filed
is striking. Whether there has been an adjudication or
simply a perfunctory denial of a claim below is rarely
ascertainable. Seldom do we have enough on which
to base a solid conclusion as to the adequacy of the
State adjudication. Even if we are told something
about a trial of the claims the applicant asserts, we
almost never have a transcript of these proceedings
to assist us in determining whether the trial was adequate. Equally unsatisfactory as a means for evaluating the State proceedings is the filing of opinions; in
less than one-fourth of the cases is more than a perfunctory order of the State courts filed.238
Thus, Brown reflects the Court’s preference for district courts
over the Supreme Court on direct review as the forum for resolving
these cases, a preference based on the Court’s view that the Court
should be focusing on “questions of sufficient gravity,”239 as well as
the burden that the “flood” of criminal cases would impose on the
Court,240 and the fact that district courts are better situated to handle
these cases for a number of reasons.241 The Court’s well-known
holding in Brown, affirming the availability of de novo review of

238
239
240
241

Brown, 344 U.S at 493–94 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Id. at 491 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
See Darr v. Burford, 399 U.S. at 235 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493–94 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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legal and mixed questions,242 was directly tied to its largely forgotten holding that Supreme Court denials of certiorari were to be given
no weight by the lower courts entertaining habeas corpus petitions.243
In sum, even during the period between 1916 and 1953, the doctrine regarding the scope of habeas review in the lower federal courts
served a forum-allocation function. Limitations on the availability
of habeas review in the lower federal courts were justified on the
ground that it was the responsibility of the Supreme Court to exercise this “delicate jurisdiction.”244 Recognition of the need for review of state convictions in some federal court was a constant; the
debate was about which federal court should undertake such review.
The view that state prisoners should remain in custody without federal review of claimed constitutional errors in their convictions was
not reflected in majority opinions during this era.
III. THE 1953–1996 PERIOD
Between its decision in Brown v. Allen245 and the enactment of
AEDPA in 1996,246 the Supreme Court adhered to the view that de
novo review was available on habeas for cognizable constitutional
claims. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts tightened the procedural
requirements for obtaining habeas relief and placed some limits on
the types of claims that could be the basis for habeas relief, and the
new limits had a significant impact on the practical availability of
habeas relief and were subjected to (mostly well deserved) criticism.247 But, unlike the limits the Court held in Williams v. Taylor
were imposed by AEDPA, the pre-AEDPA limits articulated by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts were largely consistent with the idea
that state prisoners are entitled to a federal forum for the vindication
of their constitutional rights. Even during this period, the Court’s
242

Id. at 507 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Id. at 489–97 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
244
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See Brown, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
246
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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decisions reflected its view that federal review of state court decisions resulting in custody was necessary to protect the constitutional
rights of state prisoners and ensure that the state courts faithfully
applied the Court’s constitutional precedents.248
This section discusses two substantive limitations adopted by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts and their compatibility with the notion
that state prisoners are entitled to plenary federal court review of
constitutional issues decided against them by the state courts. The
two limitations are the exclusion of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims from the scope of habeas review and the exclusion
of “new” rules not falling into one of two exceptions.
A. Stone v. Powell and Errors Relating to Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule
In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that habeas relief would be
unavailable for claimed errors by state courts in the application of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, unless the state did not
“provid[e] . . . an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim” in its courts.249 The Court thus adopted for habeas claims of Fourth Amendment error the standard that Professor
Bator had advocated for all claims of constitutional error250—a
standard akin to that adopted in Williams v. Taylor for all claims
adjudicated on the merits in state court.251 Stone thus appears to be
an exception to proposition that, after Brown and before Williams,
habeas was available for de novo federal review of constitutional
issues decided by the state courts and resulting in custody.252
On closer inspection, however, Stone is more a decision about
the Exclusionary Rule than a decision about the scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction. That is, at any rate, how the majority presented its
holding. The Court stressed that prior decisions had “established that
the [exclusionary] rule is not a personal constitutional right.”253 Rather, the exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed
248
249
250
251
252
253

See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306–08 (1989).
428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
See Bator, supra note 3, at 446.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91 (2000).
See Stone, 428 U.S. at 494–96.
Id. at 486.
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to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.”254 Given its prophylactic nature, the Court held, the rule
should not be applicable in contexts in which its benefits are outweighed by its costs.255 As support for this view, the Court cited
prior decisions limiting the rule’s applicability, such as the exception permitting the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment for purposes of impeachment256 and the
rule’s “standing” limitation, permitting only the victim of the illegal
search to invoke the exclusionary rule.257 The Court understood
these decisions to establish a “balancing” test under which the exclusionary remedy is available in a given context only if the rule’s
costs are outweighed by its benefits as a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations.258
To be sure, the majority’s application of the balancing test relied
on certain assumptions about the reliability of state courts as enforcers of federal rights that, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent,
appear to contradict basic assumptions underlying the Court’s habeas jurisprudence.259 In a footnote, the majority noted its confidence in the state courts’ ability and willingness to enforce federal
rights faithfully: “Despite differences in institutional environment
and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of
some state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there
now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional
rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States.”260 As
Justice Brennan noted, this assumption flies in the face of prior statements by the Court that “‘habeas serves as a necessary additional
incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards[,]’” and that “[t]he availability of collateral re-
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Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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See id. at 494–95.
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view assures ‘that the lower federal and state courts toe the constitutional line.’”261 Since the majority’s confidence in the lower courts
extended to all “constitutional rights,” Justice Brennan feared that
the Court’s holding portended a drastic narrowing of the availability
of habeas review generally, or at least with respect to rules that, in
the majority’s words, did not bear on the defendant’s guilt and hence
on “the basic justice of [the prisoner’s] incarceration.”262
In the end, the majority’s assumption about the reliability of
state courts as enforcers of constitutional rights should not have led
the Court to conclude that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule
on habeas outweighed the benefits of doing so. The main cost of the
exclusionary rule, according to the majority, was that it “often frees
the guilty.”263 Against this cost, the majority weighed the “incremental deterrent effect” of applying the rule on habeas.264 If the
Court had compared the incremental costs of applying the rule on
habeas with the incremental benefit of doing so, the Court would
have found them to be congruent. This would be so whether or not
one believed that the state courts were reliable enforcers of federal
rights. If the state courts are not reliable enforcers of federal rights,
then the federal courts would be freeing the guilty, but that would
be because the state courts were failing to apply the exclusionary
rule faithfully. On that assumption, application of the rule on habeas
would be necessary as a deterrent. If the state courts are reliable enforcers of the exclusionary rule, then the federal courts on habeas
would not be freeing the guilty—by hypothesis, the state courts
would be doing so. Thus, the cost of applying the exclusionary rule
on habeas that the Court identified would not be very high.265
Thus, the Court’s cost-benefit analysis was structurally flawed
and, in any event, did not really turn on the Court’s footnote assumption that state courts are reliable enforcers of constitutional rights.
261

Id. at 520–21 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262–63
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis removed).
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Id. at 492 n.31.
263
Id. at 490.
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Id. at 494.
265
One might conclude that, if state courts are reliable enforcers of the exclusionary rule, application of the exclusionary rule on federal habeas is costly from
the standpoint of judicial efficiency, but that is not the sort of cost the Court
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The latter assumption might well have justified a broader narrowing
of habeas, but the majority responded to Justice Brennan’s fear by
describing it as a “hyperbole” and making clear that “[o]ur decision
today is not concerned with the scope of the habeas statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally.”266 Indeed, Justice Powell, the author of Stone, subsequently affirmed his view that
“[r]eview on habeas to determine that the conviction rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the time of the conviction is . . .
required to ‘forc[e] trial and appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark.’”267
Instead, the majority in Stone made clear that its holding was
based on the idea “that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created
remedy rather than a personal constitutional right” and “the minimal
utility of the rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment
claims in a habeas corpus proceeding.”268 Since, as noted, the reasoning that led the Court to the latter conclusion was fundamentally
flawed, the most convincing explanation of the Court’s holding is
that the Court did not regard the exclusionary rule as a constitutional
right. So understood, Stone v. Powell is a modified application of
the established principle, also noted by the majority, that habeas relief is not available for claimed errors of non-constitutional federal
law unless “the alleged error constituted ‘a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”269 If
so, then Stone v. Powell is not in conflict with the proposition that
state prisoners have a right to de novo review via habeas corpus of
constitutional errors in their state court convictions.
266

Id. at 495 n.37.
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 687 (1971)).
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Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (“The Fourth Amendment
. . . says nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of [its] command. [The exclusionary rule] is a ‘prudential’ doctrine created by this Court to
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Id. at 477 n.10 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)
(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962))) (internal quotation
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B. Teague v. Lane and “New” Rules of Constitutional Law
The Court adopted another substantive limit on the availability
of habeas review in Teague v. Lane.270 Teague was framed as a holding regarding the retroactive applicability of Supreme Court decisions recognizing “new” rules of constitutional law.271 At one time,
the Court permitted the articulation of “new” rules of constitutional
law by the lower courts on habeas review, and the new rule was always applied in the case in which it was articulated.272 The “retroactivity” issue would be addressed in a subsequent case and would
be decided according to a multi-factor test that did not turn on
whether the later case was pending on direct review at the time of
the rule’s articulation or subsequently commenced on collateral review.273 In Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court held that new rules must
be applied to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new
rule was announced.274 “[T]he Court’s assertion of power to disregard current law in adjudicating cases before us that have not already
run the full course of appellate review,” the Court explained in Griffith, “is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional function is
not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation.”275
Although Griffith’s reasoning seemed to deny the very concept
of a “new” constitutional rule, in Teague the Court held that new
constitutional rules should generally not be applied on collateral review.276 In reaching this decision, the Court endorsed the view that
“the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for
trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
270

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 316 (“We can simply refuse to announce a new rule in a given
case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case
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standards.”277 But, the Court wrote, “[i]n order to perform this deterrence function, . . . the habeas court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings
took place.”278 For this reason, the Court held, “new” constitutional
rules should ordinarily not be applicable on federal habeas review.279
The Court recognized two exceptions to this non-retroactivity
rule.280 “First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places
‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’”281 The
Court subsequently expanded this category “to cover not only rules
forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct, but also
rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.”282 The second exception
consists of constitutional decisions recognizing “new procedures
without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished.”283 The Court in Teague thought it “unlikely that many
such components of basic due process have yet to emerge,”284 and it
has yet to find that a new constitutional rule falls in this category.
New rules that fall in either category are applicable retroactively to
prisoners seeking collateral review, but otherwise habeas relief is
available only for claims that the state court violated an “old” rule—
i.e., one that had been articulated at the time his conviction became
final.285
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In principle at least, the Teague doctrine is consistent with the
proposition that state prisoners are entitled to de novo review of their
constitutional claims. Teague merely tells the habeas court what law
they should apply in performing this de novo review. The state court
proceeding is to be tested against the law in effect at the time of the
state proceeding. Rules articulated by the Supreme Court after those
proceedings are to be disregarded unless they fall within one of the
two exceptions. If the purpose of habeas review is to provide state
courts with an incentive to apply federal law faithfully, this rule
makes some sense. After all, state trial and appellate judges cannot
reasonably be expected to comply with constitutional principles not
yet articulated.286 The Teague rule also produces, again in principle,
a sensible division of authority as between the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts.287 Unless the claim falls within one of the
two narrow exceptions the Court recognized, the role of the lower
federal courts on habeas is to carry out the comparatively mundane
task of ensuring state-court compliance with well-established constitutional rules. The Supreme Court, in directly reviewing state
court judgments of conviction, would retain the responsibility for
resolving unsettled questions of federal constitutional law arising in
state criminal cases.
As applied, however, the Teague doctrine has been rightly criticized as giving state courts an insufficient incentive to apply federal
precedents faithfully.288 The problem has primarily been the Court’s
very broad interpretation of the concept of “new” law.289 Moreover,
the Court’s test for distinguishing old from new rules blurs the line
between de novo and deferential review of state decisions. The
Court determines whether a claimed rule would be new and hence
inapplicable on habeas by asking whether a reasonable jurist examining the extant precedents would conclude that the claimed rule was
already established.
286

See id. (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 534 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
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In Wright v. West, Justice Thomas (writing for himself, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia) argued that this test effectively
requires the habeas court to defer to the state court’s interpretation
of the then-existing precedents.290 Justice O’Connor (Teague’s author) disagreed:
Teague did not establish a “deferential” standard of
review of state court determinations of federal law. It
did not establish a standard of review at all. Instead,
Teague simply requires that a state conviction on federal habeas be judged according to the law in existence when the conviction became final. In Teague,
we refused to give state prisoners the retroactive benefit of new rules of law, but we did not create any
deferential standard of review with regard to old
rules.291
Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice O’Connor:
Teague did not establish a deferential standard of review of state-court decisions of federal law. It established instead a principle of retroactivity . . . .To be
sure, the fact that our standard for distinguishing old
rules from new ones turns on the reasonableness of a
state court’s interpretation of then existing precedents suggests that federal courts do in one sense defer to state-court determinations. But we should not
lose sight of the purpose of the reasonableness inquiry where a Teague issue is raised: The purpose is
to determine whether application of a new rule would
upset a conviction that was obtained in accordance

290
See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 291 (1992) (“In other words, a federal
habeas court ‘must defer to the state court’s decision rejecting the claim unless
that decision is patently unreasonable.’” (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407, 422 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
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with the constitutional interpretations existing at the
time of the prisoner’s conviction.292
In sum, Teague retained de novo habeas corpus review for “old”
rules.293
Although Justice Thomas lost the battle in Wright v. West, he
may have won the war. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy made clear
in Wright that Teague had not mandated deferential review of “old”
constitutional claims on habeas.294 In Williams, however, these Justices joined Justice Thomas and two other Justices who had joined
his opinion in concluding that Congress, in enacting AEDPA, had
displaced de novo review of old claims that had been adjudicated on
the merits in state court, imposing the deferential standard of review
that Justice Thomas had mistakenly believed had been established
by Teague.295
The Court in Williams did not discuss whether the denial of habeas relief for wrong but reasonable errors would affect its approach
to certiorari petitions of persons convicted in state court who would
no longer be able to obtain relief from the lower federal courts on
habeas review.296 As this Article has shown, state prisoners had always had access to federal review of errors of federal constitutional
law and of mixed questions from either the Supreme Court or the
lower federal courts.297 Between 1916 and 1953, the responsibility
for providing such review shifted from the Supreme Court to the
lower federal courts as the Court came to realize that it could no
longer hope to fulfill an error-correction role.298 Between 1953 and
1996, the Court cut back on habeas relief in certain respects but
maintained the de novo standard of review in habeas cases, believing that such review provided “a necessary additional incentive for
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trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional
standards.”299
If the Court still believes that such an incentive is necessary, it
may need to rethink its current approach to certiorari petitions by
state prisoners whose access to the habeas relief has been curtailed
by AEDPA, as the Court interpreted the statute in Williams.300 Just
as habeas has always served a forum-allocation function, Williams
may require the Court to understand AEDPA as a forum-allocation
rule. The Court will need to consider whether Congress in enacting
AEDPA meant, improbably, to reestablish the regime for reviewing
state court criminal convictions that the Court emphatically rejected
in 1953.301
CONCLUSION
The scope of federal habeas relief available to state prisoners in
the years before Brown v. Allen was decided in 1953 is a famously
disputed question—a question of recognized importance to current
debates about the proper scope of habeas relief. This Article has
shown that the available scope of habeas relief has always been directly linked to the effective availability of direct review of state
criminal convictions in the Supreme Court. The need for federal review of issues of constitutional law and the application of such law
to facts decided against criminal defendants in the state courts has
always been recognized. Only the forum affording such review has
changed. Between 1789 and 1916, state criminal defendants were
entitled to review of such issues in the U.S. Supreme Court. Between
1953 and 1996, de novo review of such issues was available in the
lower federal courts via habeas. The period between 1916 and 1953
was a transitional period marked by disagreement among the Justices as to the proper federal forum for providing such review. At
first, a majority of the Court continued to regard the Supreme Court
as the proper forum for the sensitive task of reviewing and possibly
reversing state court criminal judgments that had been affirmed by
the highest state courts. Gradually, the Court came to recognize that
299
300
301
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it could not hope to fulfill an error-correction function in such cases.
The Court thus made clear in Brown v. Allen both that the Court’s
denials of certiorari petitions filed by state prisoners should not be
regarded as reflecting its views on the merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claims and that the habeas courts should review de novo
the issues of federal constitutional law and of application of such
law to fact decided against the prisoner by the state courts.

